What Caused Democrats’ No-Show Problem in 2024?

The Democrats are still trying to find out what went wrong in the 2024 elections. Did the party unfold too far from left or not enough? Was there the defeat of the Democrats because of the inability of the voter Jewish or not to convince Swing voters?

The answers to these questions usually fall on fractional lines. Analysts such as the nate con or David Shore prefer the theory of “beliefs”. They have long claimed that the Democrats failed because of the party’s inability to convince undemocrats to vote for them, mainly because their messages and political positions were too progressive. Moderation or giving a greater emphasis on economic problems with bread and oils is their proposed medicine.

On the other hand progressive as Nation‘s Walid Shahid and Kali Holloway They claimed that Trump’s victory was borrowed from a democratic person. Since the party did not give its base anything to capture, the Democrats remained at home. As Hollowi concluded, “people who really decided the 2024 elections are those who have not voted at all …” The preferred decision of these commentators is to feed the base with more progressive calls.

So who is right? This is difficult. But new data research data (CES) may bring us closer to the answer. CES is a high-quality poll with a large enough (60,000 respondents) to allow fine-grained comparisons between the US adult subgroups. With that we can get a clearer picture of the one who voted and how they treated the problems.

To begin with, it seems likely that many non -standard in the 2024 presidential election were the Democrats as a political scientist Jake Grub and its co -authors have recently shown. Here’s the point for progressives.

But while the supporters “charge the base” are right that more Democrats remained at home than Republicans, they believe that these non -standard ones refrained because the Democrats did not hold a rather progressive campaign. In order to understand whether the Democrats, which dispersed in the 2024 presidential election, were postponed when the party offered a more leftist agenda, we can compare the political preferences and demographics of voting and failure to comply with self -identified Democrats and independent democrats.

Contrary to the fact that the left optimists hoped, in 2024 the democratic non Less progressive than the Democrats who voted. For Instance, Democratic Nonvoters Were 14 points less leakly to support Banning Assault Rifles, 20 points lesse likes to supports aid to gaza, 17 points less like to report Believing that Slavery and Discrimination MAKE IT HARD FOR BLACK AMERICANS, 17 POINTS more likely to support Building a border with mexico, 20 points more like the expression fossil product, and, sadly for economic populists, 16 points lease. To Support Corporate Tax Hikes (although this group still preferred corporate taxes for 3 to 1 stock). Overall, Democrats, which were not excluded, had 18 points less likely to self -identification as “liberal” or “very liberal”. Here’s a point for centrists.

But wait, all this means that the unreasonable Democrats remained at home in 2024 because The Democrats’ politician was also Progressive? Not necessarily, while CES data give us the opportunity to judge the benefits of the release, we cannot use it to determine the detection. That is, we do not know what issues were most important for voters, and even if candidates’s positions were important factors in the decision of non -profit elections.

We also need to be careful so as not to extrapolate too much about the consequences of these results in order or should Democrats or should not moderate their political positions in different fields, because that do not rule out Democrats, Democrats support a number of views that are commonly associated with progressive as supporting the movement, counting the skin Taxation.

That we tin On the basis of CES data, however, it is unlikely that the average Democrat, which is not allocated, would decide to vote if the Democrats preferred more progressive positions on the company’s way.

But can we make any conclusions about what can Did Democrats not pay that do not pay?

Based on CES data, two things pop up: first, they were most likely not white. Only 39 percent of democratic non -standard were called white, and 28 percent were black, and 20 percent were Latin American. This means that, compositionally, the more conservative profile of unclean Democrats (compared to the Democrats vote) cannot be associated with a whiter electorate. This again grows against progressive statements that the white Democrats are particularly moving more liberal calls.

We compared the relations of the white Democrats, which were not electoral, with the results that did not pay, black and Latin American Democrats. These results should be taken with caution. Because the number of unclean black and Latin Democrats is relatively small, there is a lot of uncertainty around the estimates. Given this, some gaps between groups are large enough and consistent to offer real differences in how white, black and Latin American Democrats think about key economic and social problems.

One of the most clear rampants between groups shows questions about races, inequality and law enforcement. While most non -elections, regardless of race or ethnicity, agreed that racism remains a problem, black non -standardists were much more likely than others to perceive it as a serious barrier to the opportunity. These differences are also revealed in law enforcement views: white and Latin American non -standardists supported the increase of police financing much more than the black non -electors (and less support the reduction in the costs of the police).

Another consistent picture is that black and Latin American non -standardists tend to be more socially conservative than white non -electoors in different issues. They were more likely to agree with statements such as “women too easily offended” and more supporting abortion restrictions (although relatively little democratic non -standard/ethnic group came into this category). This conservatism is also expressed in the form of weapons and immigration. Black non -comrets were most favorable for facilitating hidden weapons, and were most likely supported by the construction of the border wall.

These divisions should not be inflated. But at least, we can say that there is little evidence that unclean black or Latin American Democrats are invariably more socially liberal than white Democrats. In addition, these figures suggest that any attempt to mobilize Democrats, which are not electoral, must fight ideological heterogeneity in their base. The efforts of the message and the information -propaganda efforts that cannot go to this tension will fight to bring the most disabled voters into the electorate.

The second thing to notice about the demographics of democratic non -profit: they were mostly a working class and relatively economically unstable. Democratic non-electionists were almost twice as likely (60 percent vs. 32 percent) to get household income less than $ 50,000 a year, they were almost three times less likely to have a four-year college degree (47 percent vs. 17 percent), they were twice as much as they are hygiene. Probably union members (27 percent vs 14 percent). In addition, Democrats, which do not rule out, were more than twice as likely than the Democrats’ vote to report how the economy is now worse than a year ago (46 percent against 22 percent), or what their income has recently decreased. And perhaps not surprising, given their economic uncertainty, democratic non -standardists were much more likely than voters to support the increase in public spending (61 percent against 52 percent). These class characteristics show that the economic relations of Democrats, which are not electoral democrats, in a clearer light. In fact, if the Democrats could do anything to achieve most of their base in 2024, then most likely it seems that they could do it by offering a convincing economic story about how they are going to improve the well-being of workers.

It is true that Democrats need to charge their basic voters, but our analysis suggests that they are unlikely to make it successfully through the strategy of progressive calls for an ideologically diverse base. Instead, the Democrats need to be convinced that the dislike clearly and securely a message about how the party plans to improve the economic life of the workers. Democrats, which are not election in 2024, were disproportionately low -income, less educated and most likely reported financial alarm. Many of them have expressed strong support for progressive economic policy, such as corporate tax raising, Medicaid expansion and increased state investment. These results are in line with a number of other poll evidence that showed that the Americans of the working class are the vast majority of democratic non-standard-firmly advocate for a wide range of progressive economic policy, Including some who are well submitted to the left of the main proposals for the economic policy of the Democrats, such as the creation of a federal job guarantee and the introduction of workers in the corporate councils of directors.

In short, while there is no single amount of message that would lead to anyone who does not exclude Democrats, there is strong evidence that the focus on economic appeals is the most promising way. This does not mean that the Democrats must ignore social problems or abandon their basic values. But that means that in order to return the disabled, the party must do more to convince the Americans of the working class-truly all races and ethnic affiliation-something will make their lives better.