The impact of Ukraine’s Aug. 6 offensive on Kursk Oblast remains an open strategic question after four weeks of increasingly intense and fluid fighting (see EDM, Aug. 14, 15).

A Ukrainian soldier on August 30, 2024 in Sudja, Kursk Region, Russia. Photo: Oleg Palchyk/Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s initial reaction to the intervention was clearly misinformed, with intelligence reporting it as another tactical raid.
“Anti-terror operation”
Only on August 24 did he find time for an extensive briefing with the Chief of the General Staff, Army General Valery Gerasimov, and his first deputy, Colonel General Sergey Rudskoy (RBC; Kremlin.ruAugust 24). The commander-in-chief had no good news for the commander-in-chief, but apparently he did not require a decisive counter-offensive aimed at the complete withdrawal of enemy troops from Russian territory. While some “patriotic” Russian bloggers claim that the Battle of Kursk marked the transformation of a “special military operation” into a real war, Putin prefers to define Russia’s defensive battles as a counter-terrorist operation.TopWar.ruAugust 29).
Putin’s lack of initiative against this intervention shows how he is trying to avoid the perception within Russia that Ukraine is a formidable enemy and that Moscow cannot win this war.
Declining support for Putin’s war policy
At the behest of the Kremlin, Russian mainstream media downplayed the Ukraine offensive and attempted to portray the continued withdrawal of Russian forces and civilians from the Kursk countryside as the “new normal.”MedusaAugust 21). Russian society finds this reassurance comforting, but not convincing, and the underlying concern is a decline in support for Putin’s war policy, which even official polling agencies have failed to camouflage (The Moscow TimesAugust 30).
The economic fallout from the disaster is slowly piling up, and many Russians are relieved that no new casualties have been claimed and that rumors of a new mobilization have faded (The Moscow TimesAugust 23; Svoboda.orgAugust 30).
Conscripts’ families worry about the fate of poorly trained soldiers, and the approaching fall draft period casts a dark shadow (Svoboda.orgAugust 21; KnowledgeAugust 26).
Funny and hawkish silence
Putin’s uncharacteristic cowardice has given Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky an opportunity to mock the Russian “red lines” drawn by the “sick old man from Red Square.”Current timeAugust 24). Putin was inclined to threaten nuclear escalation for violating hypothetical “red lines,” the exact location and content of which were conveniently vague (InsiderJune 13).
The occupation of nearly five percent of Ukraine’s Kursk region could have been considered such a violation, but it appears not to be, given the upcoming revisions to Russia’s nuclear doctrine and official signals of the Kremlin lowering its first-strike threshold (Forbes.ruJune 20). The chorus of hawkish experts, led by Russian political scientist Sergey Karaganov, is also silent on the issue of breaking the unity of the West by launching a series of nuclear strikes. Former pro-Western Russian political scientist Dmitry Trenin, a pro-Kremlin Putin supporter, now simply calls for a decisive response to NATO’s dominance in the Baltic theater.Profile.ruAugust 13).
The F-16 and nuclear escalation
Another issue previously described as a possible trigger for nuclear escalation is the long-awaited arrival of the first squadron of F-16 fighter jets in Ukraine (MedusaAugust 5). Russian commentators have long speculated that the deployment of these aircraft at air bases in Poland and Romania would make NATO countries legitimate targets for Russian nuclear strikes, but the sighting of the F-16s in Ukraine was virtually unheard of (Nezavisimaya newspaperAugust 1).
The steady expansion of Ukraine’s long-range strikes on Russian airfields and energy infrastructure is also reported as a regular news stream, and the two-week-old catastrophic fire at an oil storage facility in Rostov Oblast never fails to make headlines. (Fontanka.ruAugust 28; KommersantSeptember 1). However, the issue covered in great detail is the Joe Biden administration’s approval for the use of US-supplied weapons systems to launch long-range strikes against Russia. In addition, the list of targets presented by Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov to US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin is clearly worrisome (IzvestiaSeptember 1).
Understanding of the United States
Putin’s indifference to the protracted Battle of Kursk may be influenced by his understanding of the U.S. response to Ukraine’s attempt to change the course of the war (InsiderAugust 29). The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service made accusations that four NATO member states – the United States, Great Britain, Poland and Germany – were directly involved in the planning and organization of the offensive operation in Ukraine, but the real assessments were given to the commander. the head was probably quite different (RIA NovostiAugust 21).
Despite the noise of “patriotic” pundits, pundits in Moscow are closely following the domestic debate in the US and are aware of the high priority the Biden administration has placed on avoiding escalation in the course of the Moscow war (RIACAugust 28).
The Russian high command could have assumed that unless the West massively increased the supply of weapons and ammunition, the Ukrainian offensive in the Kursk region would soon outgrow its logistical capabilities and lose the initiative (Republic.ruAugust 27). Jingoist bloggers can get footage of a swift and decisive counter-offensive to drive the Ukrainian brigades from Russian soil (TopWar.ruAugust 31). However, the Russian General Staff is prepared to continue attacks on Pokrovsk and redeploy only the minimum necessary reinforcements to prevent a threat to the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant (MedusaAugust 31).
A second peace summit?
Putin’s intention to demonstrate Russia’s control over a strategic initiative leading to a long war is aimed at preventing Zelensky’s diplomatic maneuvers towards organizing a second peace summit by the end of the year (Nezavisimaya newspaperAugust 29). Although China remains committed to the forum, India has taken the lead in pushing this proposal to end the war, and Zelensky is willing to grant it the privilege of hosting his summit (RBCAugust 30). Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has visited both Moscow and Kiev and noted the difference the Battle of Kursk has made between these talks. Still, his mediation is unlikely to dissuade Putin from dictating the terms of Ukraine’s capitulation (Nezavisimaya newspaperAugust 27).
Both warlords gambled with the Battle of Kursk: Zelensky threw his best brigades into a surprise attack, and Putin chose to accept these attacks rather than counter them. Ukraine succeeded in changing the narrative of Russian dominance, sending shock waves through Russian society. Moscow expects to regain its position of power by capturing Pokrovsk. Putin’s belief that time is on his side may be wrong, but Ukraine can only do so much to prove him wrong.
The West’s commitment to helping Ukraine in this war must be reaffirmed by deepening and expanding its support for Ukrainian defiance.