The president’s foreign policy remains unpredictable, but his war with liberal culture has deep roots.
“Once they were naocan. Now the external political election of Trump – all “America”, read New York Times title Posted a week after Donald Trump’s victory over Kamala Harris last November. The report focused on the three nominees for Trump’s national security: Michael Waltz’s representative for national security advisor, Senator Mark Rubio for Secretary of State and Pete Hugset for the Minister of Defense. All who claims the article, obvious Term It is characterized as “ideology” that contributes to “foreign intervention or the prospects of regime change”. It was an ideology that forced the George W. Bush administration to invade Iraq in 2003 after the September 11 attacks, but according to TermIn Trump’s era, this gave way to the “transactions”. On issues ranging from Ukrainistan to China, Republican Policy Elites have Become Less Inclined Toward Military Crusades to Remake Ansactal Policies in Line with Narrow American Interes –at Least, that’s The story they wanted to tell about them.
What foreign policy Trump actually follows in his second administration remains an open issue, and the recording from his first administration offers conflicting evidence. As the president, Trump often spokely spoke about Russian President Vladimir Putin and criticized NATO, but he also Extended weapons sale To Ukraine. Trump treated the pace of bombing in Afghanistan but also agreed on the quick removal of the squad; In spite of it saber against China, he boasted President Xi Jinping’s author’s tendencies. His Last gestures Towards expansion in the Western Hemisphere – appointing territorial claims from Canada to Greenland to Panama – they heartily offer Dugin instincts, but it is difficult to learn how to take something that Trump says. He’s in the past took advice from the figures that Term At first, I would call “America” as well as the figures he called “neo -do” – and most likely he again.
The history of neoconservatism implies a lot to teach us about the current political moment, but “neoconservatism” as a transcript for the sharp policy of the hawk – at that time the common use during the 1970s. Then he served reaction protection against reaction protection Liberalism of the Cold War.
Some of the described figures, such as Daniel Bell or Daniel Patrick Minihan, rejected the label, even if they vocally expressed dissatisfaction with the new left, and others, first of all, Irving Kristol and Norman Podharets, came to him. In Article 1976 in NewsweekKristol tried to determine “neoconservatism” and came up with a list of five broad tendencies, the first four of which (abandoning the state of the big society, but not a new deal; supporting market-oriented policy; Western culture; in particular, Kristol wrote:
Neoconservatism believes that American democracy is most likely not survive in the world, which is largely hostile to American values, at least that’s why the system. Thus, neo -income are critical of isolationism after Vietnam, which is now so popular in Congress, and many are also suspicious of “Detente”. However, on concrete issues of foreign policy, neo -conservative consensus is weak.
Drawing solely on the above, it would be a stretching to extrapolate any logic album the fulfillment of the wishes, the Saddam Hussein’s regime and sent hundreds of US troops to occupy Iraq in an attempt to establish Western style democracy. However, Kristol neo -compassionism is quite capacious to include virtually all those who work in the republican foreign policy today, regardless of disagreements – except how it testifies to greater respect for American democracy and vaguely defined “American values” than Trump or Some in orbit. I will not retell a long and difficult story about how the second generation of neo -comprises, including Kristol’s own son, came to advocate a certain set of foreign policy that ended with the war in Iraq. Suffice it to say that since then neoconservatism has usually meant something closer to Term‘Definition than what Crystal suggested half a century ago.
But there is a certain value to consider that the older definition is less relevant to foreign policy than the fact that the mid-20th century intellectuals are perceived as a crisis in liberalism itself. The generation of the NEOCONS founder took care of foreign policy – mostly in the context of aggressively resisting the Soviet Union during the period when it seemed unfashionable, but they paid much more attention to what they saw as a social order violation. Most of them grew up before World War II in a working, a heavily Jewish immigrant environment, which is often imbued with Marxist doctrinal debates. But, as they reached the age after the war, they were used by the most liberal institutions that they once attacked to the left. By the mid-1960s, they became leading national figures in intellectual fields, starting from sociology to literary criticism, just in time to see how all these spheres are directly attacked by the young generation regarding the privileged left-wing activists and writers who, as,, as, as, as, as, as, as, as, as, as, as, as, as, as, as, as, as, as, as, as, as, as, as, as, as, as, as all these spheres are subjected to all these spheres. As the neo -laws saw it, the blessing of American civilization at their height were frenzied and uncertainly.
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This decorative new left, stated by the early neo -Co -conservatives, heralds the appearance of a new class of specialists with white collars whose non -friendly coalition on the new transaction. Whether to be afraid of such development at the time of this assessment is difficult to refuse it.
Since then, the American foreign policy has passed through numerous stages: the theory of the Vietnam’s dominance gave way to Kisingrian detection; Ronald Reagan, which is implemented and then suddenly twisted with a cold war; American Neoliberal Hegemony is interrupted on September 11; And more recently disappointment about the war with terrorism, which comes to either non-insulation or return to confrontation. Among the elite foreign policy community, specific doctrines and staff are constantly moving in response to certain events and problems – do not always carefully correspond to domestic political views. Meanwhile, the crisis of liberal institutions, which initiated the initial neo -conservative reaction remained virtually permanent over the same period, or at least showed the tendency again and rhymes.
The 1968 campus uprising at the Colombian University, subjected to generations for civil rights and Vietnam, became a formal moment for neo -Conservatives, and last year’s student uprising in the same campus due to the support of the Genocidal War in Israel. Problems standing on the map may change over 56 years, but the overall spectacle has been richly resonance: the campus ivy, the administration, agreed with the unfair status of the policy, radicalized students who seize control over academic buildings, severe police and an older cohort Teachers and graduates are more delighted with students’ behavior than abroad injustice that caused him. Both times on campus shocks were a harbinger of national policy: in 1968, in 2024-discredited President of the Democratic Democratic Region decided not to run for re-election, his vice president managed and lost, and the right demagogue that despised A silent majority of the electorate. Then, as it is now, intellectuals have dispersed about whom to blame and what will mean liberalism, and some over time rejected liberalism.
This is the first edition of a new monthly speaker for Nation In which I plan to trace the reaction of our culture to the pressure of today’s triumphant and pride of non -liberal law, as well as to an increasingly dissatisfied and alienated left. Each institution that once served as a construction elite liberalism – universities, newspapers, magazines, publishing houses, art, legal profession, entertainment industry and government bureaucrats at all levels – are current precedes Trump’s victory. Everyone divides between the old guard who tries to protect his accrued status and the young, often radicalized cohort, trying to secure – even if each institution is reduced in the overall influence. In Silicon Valley, in the end, great new successes benefited the small ultra-reactive click that is openly hostile to the cultural and political force of the once-new class. With the return of Trump to the White House, these technological oligarchs are now practically controlled by the administrative condition, and there are all the signs that they will possess this against the actual constituencies that make up both a cultural institution and a democratic coalition.
This will have extensive consequences, including the US foreign policy. But for the first time, this column will become the whole range of cultural contradictions, which so animated the first generation of neo -conservatives and remain unresolved. Now it may feel that the whole era is approaching the end, and, like Trump, is a final, apocalyptic resolution of dialectical forces that have divided the Americans since the 1960s. It remains to know what – if anything – will remain standing.
