Imports of minerals to the European Union from the country fell by a third, but they were largely replaced by Canada.
But there was also a politically embarrassing price. EU uranium imports from Russia have risen by more than 70% despite tough sanctions imposed on Moscow over its invasion of Ukraine.
And of course, it is Russia that has become the new best friend of the military leaders who have seized power in Niger and its allied neighbors, Burkina Faso and Mali, since 2020.
Russian military contractors are fighting alongside the Malian army in its campaign against jihadists and ethnic Tuareg separatists, and are helping protect the top junta leadership in Niger and Burkina Faso.
So, while France and Europe as a whole will be able to find ways to cope with the eventual loss of uranium supplies to Niger, the shift will not be entirely comfortable.
In the short term at least, EU countries are likely to become more dependent on Russia and its Central Asian neighbors, thus undermining their own efforts to maintain economic pressure on President Vladimir Putin during a potentially crucial period of the Ukraine crisis.
Moreover, Niger’s regime, whose attitude toward the EU in general has become almost as distrustful as its fractured relationship with France, continues to seek alternatives to its old Western partnerships.
And Iran – a potential customer, of course, of uranium – appeared as an option.
Contacts between the governments of the two countries have deepened, with Niger’s Prime Minister Ali Mohamane Lamine Zeyneh visiting Tehran in January. Rumors about a possible deal on the supply of uranium “yellow cake” (concentrate) circulated briefly a few months ago.
Meanwhile, the prospects for Orano’s hopes of resuming normal uranium operations and exports from Niger look dim, given the hostile attitude of the military regime in Niamey.
This antipathy is partly explained by Macron’s loud condemnation of the July 2023 ouster of Bazoom, one of his closest African political and security partners.
Paris has strongly backed the tough stance of the West African regional group Ecowas, and there have even been rumors that it might be willing to offer tacit support if the bloc ever went ahead with its short-lived threat to intervene militarily in Niger to restore Bazum.
In this poisonous atmosphere of hostility and mistrust, Orano was an obvious and convenient target for the junta’s revenge.
