The International Criminal Court (ICC) is in trouble.

A brief “revival” of the ICC due to Russia’s rapid response to a large-scale invasion in 2022 Ukrainee: The prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is on a visit to the Kyiv region of Ukraine. Photo: Future Publishing via Pavlo_Bagmut/ Ukrinform/Getty Images
According to commentators and observers of the Court, one crisis leads to another, thus the field of international criminal justice ‘eternal crisis’.
After a brief “revival” of the Court due to Russia’s rapid response to a large-scale invasion in 2022 Ukrainein recent events, his research on the Palestinian situation has led to further politicization and withdrawal of states from his work, including so-called liberal democracies. Israel and the United States.
At the same time, the liberal international order faces challenges of its own. Dictatorships advanceseventy percent of the world’s population currently lives under them, which means that the level of democracy has returned to the level of 1989; the liberal democratic progress of the last 30 years has ended.
Without examining what this means for the prospects for peace or increased violence, given that the ICC is entirely dependent on state cooperation to do its work, it raises questions about what it might mean for the future of international criminal justice in an increasingly autocratic world. For example, in order to effectively investigate international crimes, the Court needs access to territories, victim and witness communities, as well as security provisions for (state) personnel. Since the court does not have its own police force, it also depends on states to enforce arrest warrants. However, as we know, state cooperation with the ICC is patchy and variable at best.
… remains the main question non-state actors can fill at least some of the gaps created by the lack of state support and cooperation with the Court.
The remainder of this article addresses some of the key issues related to the past and present roles of civil society in international criminal justice, based on a recent article. Review of International Criminal Law.
Court “by the people, for the people”
Much of the early scholarship on civil society’s engagement with the ICC praised the extensive participation of NGOs in the 1998 Rome Conference that established the BCC, describing the BCC as ‘achievements of global civil society – courtby the people, for the people‘. Since the ICC’s inception in 2002, international human rights NGOs have been involved in almost all aspects of the Court’s work, from agenda-setting, documenting and investigating crimes, communicating with victims and victim communities, to lobbying states for political and financial support. . The trial, advocacy for the ratification and implementation of the ICC Statute in domestic justice systems, capacity building for international justice – the list is endless. International human rights NGOs have become integral defends international criminal justice As part of the court’s daily activities.
New actors in recent years
In recent yearsAs evidenced by ongoing developments in accountability efforts for international crimes in Syria and Ukraine, new additional “types” of NGOs and civil society actors have become prominent in the field of international criminal justice.
In response to the lack of ICC jurisdiction over the conflict in Syria, various civil society actors, including international organizations and local NGOs, have worked to collect and preserve information, document and build cases. Responsibility for international crimes committed in Syriaincluding by the state itself. This includes local NGOs such as the Syrian Network for Human Rights and documentation entities such as the Violations Documentation Center established by Syrians immediately after the uprising, Bellingcat, the UN Commission on Syria, the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) and the International Justice and Accountability Commission ( CIJA).
While in the past local and international NGOs have been involved in documenting international crimes, including for the ICTY and ICTR, there is something qualitatively new about actors like CIJA working in the field of international justice. He has witnessed the increasing privatization of international criminal justice.moving away from the practice of conducting international criminal investigations under the auspices of state agencies‘. Because Syria is not a member of the ICC (and is a closed autocracy) and because China and Russia vetoed the Security Council’s referral of the situation to the ICC, the jurisdictional gap in international criminal justice has opened up for these types of crimes. ‘entrepreneurial justice‘. However, the privatization of international criminal justice may raise some accountability issues. Interestingly, these models are based on “local capacities” within the autocratic state, i.e. dissidents and local NGOs.
Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine led to an unprecedented international (western) mobilization to investigate and prosecute war crimes. Numerous local and international NGOs are now involved in collecting, documenting, investigating and preparing a large amount of information on war crimes for prosecution in various courts, legal institutions and jurisdictions.
“Democratization” of NGOs and civil society subjects
Along with contributions from a number of international organizations and western states, including the ICC and Eurojust, local NGOs in Ukraine are heavily involved in documenting Russian war crimes. Documents of war crimes are also collected among the Ukrainian population, the Ukrainian prosecutor’s office created a special document. home page where citizens can register and document war crimes.
This “democratization” of local NGOs and civil society actors involved in documenting international crimes is facilitated by digital technologies and the availability of digital evidence such as open source data. Important problems with use remain new technologies and open source research-especially in relation to the digital divide – their potential appears to be particularly beneficial for local NGOs, both by providing access to hard-to-reach areas and by challenging state narratives. Importantly, however, crowdsourcing research depends on the existence of a sophisticated digital infrastructure that exists in Ukraine but is absent in many other ICC situations.
Professional and transnational private industry
In short, what we see emerging within the ecology of international criminal justice is an increasingly professionalized and transnational private industry willing to gather evidence and prepare cases for prosecution under universal jurisdiction or, if time permits, international criminal court(ies). This means that the growing wave of autocratization around the world is paralleled by important changes in the subjects and activities of civil society interaction with the BCC.
These observable changes are driven both by technological advances and, most importantly, by the lack of jurisdiction and lack of state cooperation with the ICC. The diversification of civil society’s engagement with the ICC and international criminal justice more broadly—with non-profit investigative organizations, private technology companies, and domestic NGOs that focus more on documentation and research than advocacy—requires further investigation—not least of all of which the ICC and more what it means for the pursuit of international criminal justice in a broad sense.
Broader trends in international criminal justice
First, the diversification of civil society actors at the ICC reflects broader trends in the international criminal justice ecosystem. The ICC was originally intended by its founders to replace ad hoc judicial institutions dealing with specific situations – for a time it represented the pinnacle of international criminal responsibility. Today, this high position in the hierarchy of international criminal responsibility is increasingly challenged by the proliferation of ad hoc, locally specific and quasi-judicial “responsibility” institutions. The UN’s “new generation” of accountability mechanisms for Syria, Myanmar and ISIS include “collecting, collating, analyzing and preserving evidence of international crimes … in accordance with criminal justice standards and making that evidence available for domestic or international prosecutions” (D’Alessandra et al 2021).
In response to Russia’s large-scale intervention in Ukraine, the EU, together with EuroJust, has significantly improved the collection, processing and storage of evidence – for example through the International Center for the Prosecution of Crimes of Aggression Against Ukraine – in anticipation of future domestic or legal prosecution. This is referred to as “stakeholder reorientation”.turn of responsibility‘ in the international criminal justice ecosystem, parallels the increasing use of universal jurisdiction by local authorities when prosecuting international crimes, such as those committed by Syrian nationals in Syria but prosecuted in Germany by Daesh. In other words, there has been a marked fragmentation and decentralization of international criminal justice, with the ICC increasingly referring to itself as a “capacity builder” and relinquishing its hegemonic role in international criminal justice. it is meant to be once.
More effective investigations and prosecutions
Second, this fragmentation of international criminal justice can make the investigation and prosecution of international crimes more effective, as trials can be held in third countries under universal jurisdiction.
On the other hand, considering that it does not have a monopoly on international criminal responsibility and its institutional structure makes it vulnerable to state power, especially great state power, one can ask what its future holds in general.
The emergence of new actors documenting international crimes and the professionalization of civil society actors “provide increasing evidence that in the new international criminal justice ecosystem, non-law enforcement institutions remain on the periphery of accountability initiatives, while domestic jurisdictions emerge as the primary avenues of accountability.” (Aksamitovska 2021). Furthermore, one might question whether international justice (usually) sought in the name of developing this accountability actually creates more “justice” for local populations and civil society.
Indeed, we can see a kind of expansion.donor fairnessand a more overt politicization of the goals of international prosecutions.
Rather than claiming universality, it may increasingly give voice to the liberal monologue in an increasingly autocratic world.
Further Reading on Electronic International Relations
The author
Kjersti Lohne He is a Scientific Professor at the University Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and Professor of Criminology at the University of Oslo.