Baltic Sea undersea ‘sabotage’ sets stage for escalating NATO-Russia contest

LONDON — A spate of suspected sabotage operations against undersea cables in the Baltic Sea has raised the prospect of a dangerous 2025 in NATO’s northern theater, with allied leaders vowing closer surveillance and tougher action against Russian- and Chinese-linked and other vessels accused of nefarious efforts. there

“NATO will strengthen its military presence in the Baltic Sea,” alliance chief Mark Rutte said in late December after the latest case of alleged sabotage, condemning “any attack on critical infrastructure.”

Rutte’s commitment came after the latest of three suspected sabotage operations in the Baltic Sea — the destruction of the Estlink 2 power cable and four internet cables on Christmas Day. The Estlink 2 cable – together with the Estlink 1 cable – transfers electricity from Finland to Estonia across the Gulf of Finland.

Finnish authorities quickly seized control of the ship suspected of damaging the Estlink 2 cable — the Eagle S. Despite being flagged in the Cook Islands, Finnish and European Union officials said the Eagle S is part of Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet.” tanks

On January 3, Finnish authorities said work had begun to repair the cable and forensic samples would be taken as part of the investigation. Eight sailors were still under a travel ban while the search continued, they added.

NATO accuses Moscow of using tankers and other vessels to avoid an international sanctions campaign over fossil fuel exports, prompted by the Kremlin’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The Atlantic Council described this “shadow fleet” as consisting of old ships that often sail without Western insurance, with opaque ownership and regularly changing names and national registries.

Allied officials say some of the sick ships double as low-tech sabotage ships.

There may be 1,400 vessels in Russia’s shadow fleet, according to maritime risk management firm Windward. In December 2023, energy cargo tracking firm Vortexa estimated that since January 2021, 1,649 vessels had operated in what the Atlantic Council called an “opaque market,” including 1,089 carrying Russian crude oil.

Cat and mouse in the sea

December’s round of suspected sabotage prompted the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force — a regional defense bloc that includes Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden — to launch an advanced AI-assisted reaction system. “To Track Potential Threats to Undersea Infrastructure and Control Russia’s Shadow Fleet.”

At the meeting of NATO’s Baltic states in Helsinki on January 14, Finnish President Alexander Stubb said that “necessary measures will be taken to secure the critical underwater infrastructure” and “strengthen NATO’s presence in the Baltic Sea and respond to the threat”. Raised by Russia’s shadow fleet.”

But the allies have a great challenge to protect the 145,560 square kilometers of sea that are crossed by 4,000 ships a day.

NATO’s monitoring efforts are complicated by “the sheer scale of the commercial trade sector and the fact that ownership structures are often quite opaque and complex,” said Sidharth Kaushal, senior research fellow for sea power at Britain’s Royal United Services Institute. – said ABC News.

“A ship can have multiple beneficial owners, its owners do not necessarily belong to the state in which it is registered, so it is very difficult to attribute its activity to a certain state,” he explained.

Ships with ties to Russia and China can play a big role, but so do ships with no ties to Moscow or Beijing.

“The Russians have a pretty wide spectrum of merchant ships to choose from,” Kaushal said. “In fact, it’s odd that they’ve opted for a ship that’s somehow connected to their shadow fleet.”

The Baltic Sea is also relatively shallow. Its average depth is about 180 feet, compared to 312 feet in the North Sea and 4,900 feet in the Mediterranean Sea.

Getting cables or pipelines to the bottom of the Baltic is much easier than in the world’s largest bodies of water, like the Atlantic Ocean with an average depth of 10,932 feet or the Pacific Ocean at 13,000 feet.

“In the Atlantic, for example, some pretty specialized equipment has to be used to go after subsea infrastructure,” Kaushal said. In the Baltic, “much simpler tools — things like anchor drags — are perfectly viable means of attack.”

NATO toolbox

Guarding specific sites is more realistic than identifying and monitoring all potential saboteurs. After damage to Estlink 2 was reported, for example, Estonia said it had sent naval vessels to protect Estlink 1.

Special forces divers were also tested during Italy’s Bold Machina 2024 naval exercise in November, with underwater sensors that NATO said could one day be used to protect underwater infrastructure.

“That’s the only way to reduce the problem – to focus on critical infrastructure, rather than trying to achieve wide-area surveillance in an area like the Baltic,” Kaushal said.

But NATO ships will be limited in what they can do to prevent damage. “International freedom of navigation limits what ships can do in international waters, or even in their exclusive economic zone,” Kaushal said.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea warns that freedom of navigation may be in jeopardy if the passage of a ship harms the peace, good order or security of coastal states.

Historic agreements — such as the 1884 Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables — can also provide allies with an opportunity to act against suspicious vessels.

But questioning the passage of civilian vessels could have bad consequences elsewhere. NATO could push for more muscular policing in the Baltics against stronger Chinese naval activity, for example in the South China Sea, or push for more sanctions on Iran in the Persian Gulf.

“I think it’s something that nations, particularly Western nations, have gotten away with,” Kaushal said.

Local allied leaders, at least, seem to be calling for action. The alleged attack in December is only the latest in a series of alleged sabotage incidents in the Baltics.

In November, two crossing submarine cables — the BCS East-West Interlink connecting Lithuania Sweden and the C-Lion1 fiber optic cable and the C-Lion1 connecting Germany and Finland — were damaged in the Baltic Sea.

Authorities suspected that the Chinese-flagged cargo ship Yi Peng 3 caused the damage. Officials from Germany, Sweden, Finland and Denmark boarded the vessel off the Danish coast to inspect the vessel and question the crew. Later, Yi Peng 3 sailed to Egypt.

The first notable incident of suspected cable sabotage in the Baltic Sea occurred in October 2023, when the Hong Kong-flagged ship Newnew Polar Bear dragged anchor and damaged the Balticconnector gas pipeline connecting Estonia and Finland. The nearby EE-S1 telecommunications cable was also damaged.

Investigators recovered a ship’s anchor on the seabed near the damaged cables, with grooves on either side of the cables indicating its route. Finland’s National Research Office said the New Polar Bear was missing one of its anchors.

In August, the Chinese government admitted that the ship had “accidentally” damaged underwater infrastructure, citing a “severe storm”.

2025 in the Baltic theater

Even before the ships began damaging cables in the Baltic region, the strategic sea — which some allied leaders referred to as the “NATO lake” after Sweden and Finland joined the alliance — apparently played host to Russia’s covert war-related operations. in Ukraine

The Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines transporting natural gas from Russia to Germany were bombed in September 2022, the first significant incident of suspected sabotage in the Baltic Sea since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022.

The pipeline has long been criticized by North American and European skeptics of Berlin’s business ties with Moscow, particularly leaders in Ukraine and the Baltic region, who see the pipeline as a springboard for Russia’s hybrid war.

Investigators have yet to determine who was responsible for the apparent sabotage of the pipelines, with unconfirmed reports linking Russia, the US and Ukraine to the explosions. All have denied participation.

The Baltic is therefore already an important theater in the wider conflict between Russia and the West.

The potential value for Russia is clear. With just a few tankers, Moscow could force its NATO rivals to devote significant time and resources to maintaining undersea infrastructure. When sabotage occurs, the relative ease of access to the Baltics and the energy needs of regional nations can increase their impact.

“The gas network in the area is not particularly well integrated with the rest of Europe,” said Kashaul. “In much of Europe, this would be a bit of a nuisance, but limited sabotage in the Baltic Sea — particularly with regard to gas pipelines — could have quite disproportionate consequences.”

European nations are very sensitive to gas outages because of the economic consequences and thus the polls. Energy security has been one of the main issues undermining the continent’s response to the Russian war. Moscow has tried to exploit this weak point.

But the submarine escapes in the Baltic are not necessarily a gratuitous success for Russia.

Moscow’s shadowy operators “have so far enjoyed freedom of navigation and the ability to freely move Russian oil above the price ceiling through NATO-controlled waters,” Kashaul said.

If NATO nations prove that sanctions-violating vessels are involved in sabotage, the ghost ships may face further retaliation.

But this can also cause an increase. A Danish intelligence report cited by Bloomberg, for example, indicated that Russia has begun attaching military escorts to tankers transiting the Baltic.

That development is “quite plausible,” Kashaul said, although he noted that the intensity of normal convoy operations may be beyond Russia’s relatively small Baltic Fleet.

A more militarized approach, he added, could also unsettle the non-Russian citizens who man the ships.

“Whether the people on these ships want to take the risk, despite the Russians providing escort and convoys, is another factor,” Kashaul said.

ABC News’ Zoe Magee and Ellie Kaufman contributed to this report.