Last week was full of shocks for Moscow. The US finally approved $61 billion in aid to Ukraine, the European Parliament passed a resolution rejecting the legitimacy of Russia’s March presidential elections, and Russian Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov was arrested in Moscow on bribery charges.
Timur Ivanov in court. Photo: Courts of general jurisdiction of the city of Moscow via Telegram
The last case was the most surprising, since there have been practically no serious cases of corruption in Russia since the beginning of the war in Ukraine (The Moscow TimesApril 25).
Ivanov was a prominent member of Moscow’s high society and had ties to Putin’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov and First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Sergey Kiriyenko (The Moscow TimesApril 25). Immediately after the meeting of the Collegium of the Ministry of Defense, Ivanov was detained by participating in the first court session in full form (KommersantApril 24).
The accusation of corruption against Ivanov seems too pointless for such a serious and public prosecution. This led to widespread speculation that he might have committed treason, although officials denied the rumor (RBC.ruApril 24).
The only large-scale treason investigation in Russia currently involves a group of scientists developing hypersonic technologies. The main driving force behind the investigation is Russian President Vladimir Putin’s anger over poor weapons performance, including the Kinjal air-launched missile (Medusa.ioFebruary 1; KommersantApril 18).
Ivanov had nothing to do with this study. Instead, he was responsible for managing the finances of prestigious construction projects, including Patriot Park, a popular park full of military exhibits commemorating World War II, or the Great Patriotic War, as it is called in Russia.IzvestiaApril 24). Ivanov’s main patron is Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, who quickly fired his discredited deputy. However, Shoigu is reluctant to comment further, possibly because his involvement in corruption was exposed several years ago by a non-governmental organization (NGO) led by Alexei Navalny.Stories MediaApril 24).
An unexpected attack by the FSB
The attack by the Federal Security Service (FSB) on a prominent figure in the senior Shoigu’s staff was completely unexpected, since the defense minister is leading Putin’s war in Ukraine (Carnegie PolicyApril 24). After Prigogine’s death, Shogyu successfully helped suppress all “patriotic” voices criticizing the president’s actions (Novaya newspaper EuropeApril 24).
A vociferous group of “mil-bloggers” dared to slander corruption in the armed forces, presenting it as the main reason for the lack of a decisive victory in the slow-moving spring offensive (Svoboda.orgApril 24). Shoigu’s control over the propaganda machine is still strong enough to minimize damage. Still, a new batch of US and NATO arms to Ukraine could undermine its position and even make it a convenient scapegoat (Independent newspaperApril 25).
A distraction?
The FSB may now use Ivanov’s arrest to divert political attention from a major blunder: the Crocus City Hall terror attack, for which the FSB failed to provide a plausible excuse (see EDM, March). 25, 26, 27, 28). The investigation continues into the bogus “Ukraine connection,” but this blame game cannot help explain why the FSB failed to prevent the attack (Republic.ruApril 24). Instead, evidence points to the establishment of an Islamic State base in Tajikistan’s Khorasan Province (ISKP) and the rapid growth of its networks among migrant workers in Russia (TopWar.ruApril 19; KommersantApril 27). Russian security services have neither the resources nor interest in the rise of Islamist radicalism, as their priorities are focused on suppressing anti-war sentiment (InsiderApril 5).
Another headache for the FSB is instability in the North Caucasus, exemplified by the recent fatal attack on a police patrol in Karachay-Cherkessia (see EDM, March 7, April 2; Kavkaz-uzelApril 23). Tensions between Dagestan and Chechnya nearly escalated into a bigger conflict when a group of Chechen fighters came to the aid of an officer who was being held at a checkpoint for drunk driving.Business-OnlineApril 24). Another looming challenge in the region is the deteriorating health of Chechnya’s brutal ruler Ramzan Kadyrov, whose death could trigger a leadership struggle for his criminal empire (Novaya newspaper EuropeApril 26).
The old political elite
Putin has been reluctant to change or change government officials, even though he may have helped restore power (with the exception of Ivanov’s arrest). He could, for example, punish governors in the Southern Urals and Western Siberia regions, where poorly constructed dams exacerbate the effects of seasonal flooding (Forbes.ruApril 16). Putin’s reluctance stems from an existential fear that he and those closest to him are approaching their twilight years and will not be able to hold on to power much longer. Secretary of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev, director of the FSB Alexander Bortnikov and head of the Rostex defense corporation Sergey Chemezov are also in their 70s, like Putin (Carnegie PolicyApril 8). Putin prefers to keep old-timers like Shoigu, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Chairman of the Federation Council Valentina Matvienko, rather than promoting young politicians who attract attention only because of their age (InsiderApril 3).
Behind this old guard are 60-year-old politicians who have little reason to worry about the expected change of government after Putin’s inauguration on May 7 (Independent newspaperApril 15). Among them are Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin and Kiriyenko, who is quite effective in his duties. In addition to government ministers, heads of many state corporations, such as Rosneft’s Igor Sechin, Gazprom’s Alexey Miller, and VTB Bank’s Andrey Kostin, also feel safe in the seats of power they have occupied for a long time (The Moscow TimesApril 18).
Putin should focus on ambitious careerists in their 50s who are stuck in the lower echelons of the state bureaucracy. By allowing Ivanov to fall, Putin gave a clear warning. They have good reason to doubt his commitment and loyalty to the war, which is a key part of his legacy, but to them, it’s just profit. In a quarter of a century, Putin’s regime has mutated into a harsh autocracy. Still, corruption remains its organizing principle, and mobilizing dwindling resources to wage war runs counter to the interests of many, if not most, middle-level functionaries in Moscow’s overgrown power pyramid.
Reinventing the deeply corrupt and deeply degraded Russian state as a war machine is a very ambitious mission for the aging crooks who managed to seize control of Russia in the wake of the turmoil of the late 1990s and bring the country to the brink of yet another disaster.
