The announcement of the Nobel Peace Prize on October 11 coincided with a dangerous phase of two long wars – Israel’s war against Hamas and Hezbollah and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine.
(Hiroshima after the atomic bombing in 1945Photo: GettyImages via PrismaBildagentur/UniversalImagesGroup
Israel is preparing to strike Iran in response to its largest-ever attack of about 180 Iranian ballistic missiles, which primarily targeted Israeli air bases and produced very few hits (TopWar.ruOctober 8).
Russia mulls potential responses to Ukraine’s long-range strikes with Western weapons systems; this has not yet been authorized, but such a step is considered inevitable by Moscow (Nezavisimaya newspaperOctober 9).
The Norwegian Nobel Committee has been chosen to welcome a Japanese non-governmental organization’s project to preserve the tragic memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
This points to the crucial importance of maintaining the “nuclear taboo”, the international norm against the first use of nuclear weapons.KommersantOctober 11).
The decision on the Nobel prize was announced during a meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian in Ashgabat, the capital of Turkmenistan, to discuss the finalization of an agreement on advanced strategic partnership and expansion of military ties, which both sides denied.IzvestiaOctober 11).
Coincidentally, another dictator, North Korea’s Kim Jong-un, took the opportunity that day to send an “ultimatum” to South Korea to reinforce his earlier declarations that the country was ready to use nuclear weapons.InterfaxOctober 4; RBCOctober 11). These three autocrats cannot form anything resembling an alliance because their main interests are only their own survival and grasping power, but they have a lot in common. This is especially true of their willingness to argue that the aggressive behavior of any rogue country cannot deter the West’s determination to punish violations of international norms, including the nuclear taboo.
They are not afraid of the West’s response
Because these leaders do not fear a response from the West, they feel safe making such bold statements. Kim Jong Un made this bluff, believing that the United States and its allies see the modernization of China’s strategic arsenal as the main threat in the current environment (Nezavisimaya newspaperSeptember 25). Kim Jong-un may even take solace in a stern warning to Japan from the Russian Foreign Ministry regarding joint US-Japan military exercises (TASSOctober 11). Pezeshkian has only a limited say on Iran’s official nuclear doctrine and potential escalation, as decision-making power in Iran rests with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the leadership of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).IzvestiaOctober 8). In addition, Pezeshkian is convinced that Russia will do practically nothing to help his country against any Israeli strike (Carnegie PolicyOctober 8).
Putin has found himself in the awkward position of having his and his aides’ frequent nuclear bluffs equated with Kim Jong-un’s irresponsible nuclear bluffs. Similarly, warnings from its diplomats about the increased risk of direct military conflict between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have become almost ritualistic (RIACOctober 8). Putin has upped the ante on nuclear rhetoric by supporting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s victory plan, seeking to sway the West’s decisions, and now needs to hide the necessary tone from now on (see: EDMSeptember 25; Novaya newspaper EuropeSeptember 28).
This backsliding may be helped by Moscow’s ability to pretend that Ukrainian successes, even shocking advances such as the invasion of the Kursk region, are completely insignificant (see EDM, August 15, September 3; InsiderOctober 11). Over the past few weeks, artillery arsenals in Tver and Bryansk regions have been destroyed by Ukrainian forces, air bases such as Khanskaya in Adyge region have been attacked by large drones, and an oil depot in Feodosia, Crimea, has been burning for days. These events were not covered by the mainstream Russian media and did not result in any Russian response (Histories.media; Svoboda.orgOctober 9; NV.uaOctober 10). If the country’s defense minister does not formally authorize long-range strikes with British-made weapons at an upcoming NATO meeting, this pattern of denial could perfectly cover Ukraine’s strikes with UK-supplied Storm Shadow missiles. in Brussels.
There is no internal pressure in Russia
Putin is under no domestic pressure to exceed the nuclear threshold. Public opinion in Russia is increasingly favoring an immediate ceasefire, according to polls that tend to burnish the official position. The option of returning parts of occupied territories is also gaining popularity (see EDMSeptember 24; Levada.ruOctober 9). The differences in perception are stark, but few people in Russia are really keen on war. Moscow claims life is going on as “normal”, while Sakhalin’s governor writes a short obituary for another fallen soldier every day (see EDM, August 14, September 9, October 1; Svoboda.orgOctober 9).
The draft state budget presented at the beginning of October demonstrates dryly and professionally that a significant increase in financing for the war can be achieved only by raising taxes and cutting spending on many social programs (see EDMOctober 3; The Moscow TimesOctober 11). It is clear to economists that pouring more money into an overburdened military-industrial complex will not lead to any increase in output, providing little more than high inflation (see EDM, May 30, August 1; Forbes.ruOctober 2). However, the government considers it necessary to minimize the reception of hard truths and to spare the commander-in-chief unpleasant lessons from elementary economic logic (Carnegie PolicySeptember 30).
As a result, Putin proceeds with the impression that Russia and its people have hardened against the trials of war, and that his regime has successfully transitioned from a corrupt patronage to a disciplined militaristic hierarchy. This misconception benefits the Kremlin because it reduces its willingness to resort to nuclear weapons. On the contrary, every unexpected failure on the battlefield leads to an overreaction and a new nuclear loss (see EDMSeptember 30).
Russia aspires to be one of the “poles” in a supposed multipolar world and hopes to play a responsible leadership role in reshaping the global order in the upcoming BRICS (a loose political-economic grouping originally composed of Brazil). Russia, India, China and South Africa) summit.
Profile of Russia as a rogue state
But this ambition has been undermined and compromised by its aggression against Ukraine, which has cast Russia’s profile as a rogue state on a par with Iran and North Korea. Any sign of a possible breaking of the nuclear taboo, given new impetus by the 2024 Nobel Peace Prize, points to Russia’s growing vulnerability rather than residual strength. After this announcement, the Western coalition supporting Ukraine may contact and even join the global coalition that condemns any hand that reaches the nuclear button.
