Russia’s aggressive war strategy against Ukraine, which passed the 1,000-day mark last week, is putting the country’s economy, society and armed forces under enormous pressure that Moscow’s militaristic propaganda cannot fully cover.
Vladimir Putin (right) and Kim Jong-un ahead of Russia-North Korea talks in Pyongyang, North Korea in June 2024. Photo: Contributor/Getty Images
The relentless attacks necessary to prove Russia’s control of the strategic initiative are inflicting such heavy casualties that recruitment based on unusual payments cannot compensate for the number of casualties (see EDMAugust 7; MediazoneNovember 22). Public support for war cannot be measured with any precision, but opinion polls show a steady increase in preference for immediate peace talks (Levada.ruNovember 6; The Moscow TimesNovember 22). Escalation is the only way to change the rapidly developing attrition pattern.
In November, Russian President Vladimir Putin chose to take three ostentatious escalating steps aimed both at undermining Ukraine’s will to resist and at weakening Western resolve against Russian aggression.
Improving the nuclear doctrine
The first step was to refine Russia’s nuclear doctrine, a declarative measure Putin sought to maximize impact on. First, he issued a series of heavy-handed instructions for amendments, then announced some changes at a special session of the Security Council in September, and finally signed the decree in full on November 19 (IzvestiaNovember 19).
Mainstream experts advocated the symbolic importance of lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, but the amendments were merely vague statements and had previously been debated at length (RIACNovember 22). More ambitious statements were proposed and expected, but Putin had to consider the condition that China would not indulge in its nuclear weapons frenzy. He did not dare to take a strong negative stance against Beijing’s hostile position on nuclear first use (Carnegie PolicyNovember 21).
North Korean troops
Putin’s second step was the deployment of approximately 12,000 North Korean troops to the war zone in the Kursk region. Valery Zalujny, the former commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, assessed this as an escalation of the third world war (see: EDMOctober 30; RBC; Forbes.uaNovember 21).
The Kremlin’s official position was neither denial nor confirmation, but the media was instructed to ignore the development, so only some elliptical references were made by commentators and “patriotic” bloggers (TopWar.ruNovember 10; KommersantNovember 21). There was no doubt in Moscow that the transformation of the strategic partnership with Pyongyang into an “armed brotherhood” would provoke a strong reaction from the Biden administration (Carnegie PolicyNovember 5). The long-delayed authorization for Ukraine to use Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) to strike Russian territory was certainly expected in Moscow, and revisions to nuclear doctrine were only part of the prepared response (PuzzleNovember 22).
Missile strikes
The Ukrainian strikes were dropped without delay, but neither the strike on the arsenal in Bryansk region nor the destruction of the command center in Kursk region increased due to previous similar strikes with Ukrainian weapons systems.Republic.ruNovember 22). However, Putin considered it appropriate to take the third step of escalation – to strike the Yuzhmash plant on the Dnieper with a new medium-range ballistic missile called “Oreshnik” (see EDM; Nezavisimaya newspaperNovember 21). Unlike the Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missile or the Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile, it was the first launch of this mobile missile, combining elements of different designs and carrying multiple warheads.MedusaNovember 22; The Moscow TimesNovember 23). Putin was delighted to announce the success of this “combat test”, especially when the Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile test in September, which he announced was ready for deployment in May 2018, resulted in an explosion in the silo.KommersantNovember 22).
As Ukraine’s long-range strikes continue, the illusion of achieving escalation control may soon end, with Putin’s promise of more “tests” and mass production of the Oreshnik constrained by limited industrial capacity at the Votkinsk plant (KommersantNovember 23). It has no more “safe” options for escalation and will be forced to assess the consequences of resuming nuclear testing or carrying out a non-strategic nuclear strike, as some hardline experts in Moscow continue to recommend (RIACNovember 21). Although the topic of nuclear war can be “normalized” in jingoistic propaganda,
Putin is perfectly aware of the extreme risks, and public opinion is still deeply concerned and strongly opposed to bringing the so-called “special military operation” to the brink of nuclear disaster (The Moscow TimesNovember 22).
NATO response
Moscow is not particularly worried about the upcoming meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-Ukraine Council, which was called to discuss the joint response to the Oreshnik missile attack. Instead, the Kremlin is paying close attention to the reactions of the coalition’s two main leaders, the United States and Germany, both of which are in political transition.NV.uaNovember 22). In the latter case, Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s words about a “terrible escalation” are being interpreted as a sign of paralyzing anxiety that could potentially affect the outcome of the upcoming elections (RBCNovember 22). Of course, the main focus is on changes in US risk assessments, and experts in Moscow are preparing opinions on US President Joe Biden’s decision to authorize strikes in Ukraine as an attempt to limit the options available to President-elect Donald Trump (see EDMNovember 18; “Rossiiskaya Gazeta”November 19). These speculations ignore that the decision to allow the strikes was announced after the two leaders met at the White House, as well as after Biden met with Chinese President Xi Jinping at the G20 summit in Brazil.Novaya newspaper EuropeNovember 22).
The Trump administration
The Kremlin expects the Trump administration to try to end its war on Ukraine and is preparing positions to neutralize U.S. pressure for compromise and ensure that any concessions that may be made come first from Kiev.
But these efforts do not reflect the real impact of Putin’s reckless ascent on the ladder of escalation. Any possible deal that involves modest gains and restoration of stability is undermined by Russia’s desire to subdue a recalcitrant Ukraine and tear apart the Western coalition.
A truce that depends on the goodwill of an aspiring Russian autocrat carries serious security risks for Europe, as it will fail to prevent another aggressive step by the Kremlin, driven by illusions of superior military power.
Ukraine cannot hope to restore its territorial integrity by inflicting a crushing military defeat on Russia, but a succession of successful defensive and offensive operations, bolstered by continued Western military support, could deprive Putin of strategic initiative and frustrate his escalating dominance.
