Russian President Vladimir Putin announced neither surprising nor radical changes in Russia’s nuclear doctrine on September 25.Kremlin.ruSeptember 25).
President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on September 25, 2024. Photo: Getty Images
He pledged to revise the government’s vague document back in June. In the following months, many “patriotic” experts advocated various drastic changes, from the formalization of the “escalation to de-escalation” proposal to the violation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime (see). EDMJune 3; KommersantSeptember 11).
Putin favored very modest amendments and tried to compensate for this moderation with staged weight in his Security Council “permanent conference on nuclear deterrence”. The conference was never known to exist before, but this time it was covered on prime-time television (KommersantSeptember 25; MedusaSeptember 26). Hypothetically announced changes to Russia’s rationale for using a large nuclear arsenal have already been scrutinized, but the timing of Putin’s heavy hints and direct threats suggests his real intentions.
Typically, Putin’s summit efforts are aimed at influencing key decisions in the US-led coalition to expand support for Ukraine and provide higher-capacity weapons systems such as Leopard main battle tanks or M142 HIMARS rocket launchers. The physical arrival of these weapons, such as the deployment of the first squadron of F-16 fighters in early August, even if equipped with JSOW glide bombs, is not always considered.IzvestiaSeptember 26).
The previous escalation of Putin’s nuclear rhetoric coincided with a meeting between US President Joe Biden and UK Prime Minister Key Starmer over whether to allow Ukraine to use the Storm Shadow air-launched missile to strike targets deep inside Russian territory.InterfaxSeptember 14; see EDMSeptember 16). The doctrinal changes were announced during Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s meetings with Biden, Vice President Kamala Harris and, perhaps most importantly for Moscow, former US President Donald Trump.“Rossiiskaya Gazeta”September 27). The upcoming meeting between Biden, Starmer, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and French President Emmanuel Macron is likely to invite new threats from Putin (IzvestiaSeptember 25).
Moscow rarely responds to Ukraine’s long-range strikes with enhanced nuclear saber strikes, even the spectacular ones that destroyed a large artillery arsenal in Toropets, Tver Oblast (Current timeSeptember 19). Despite Putin’s order to expel the “bandits” from Russian territory, the still ongoing shock attack by Ukrainian troops on the Kursk region did not receive any nuclear response (see EDMSeptember 3; InsiderSeptember 27). Kiev wants to capitalize on Russia’s self-restraint, which has caused great confusion among Moscow hawks, by displaying the empty symbolism of Putin’s “red lines” (MedusaSeptember 23; see EDMSeptember 25). The new boundaries drawn in the updated Russian nuclear doctrine will undoubtedly be breached without delay in ways and means that will again surprise the General Staff (Carnegie PolicySeptember 26; NV.uaSeptember 27).
Detached from the battles in the kinetic war, the ups and downs of the Russian peaks show a clear connection with the peaceful attacks of Ukraine. Zelensky’s first peace summit in Bürgenstok, Switzerland, on June 15-16, 2024, not only provoked Russia’s furious diplomatic sabotage campaign, but also heightened nuclear rhetoric, particularly at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum.Fontanka.ruJune 7; Forbes.uaJune 18; see EDMJune 20). This time, Putin’s position was aimed at disrupting Zelensky’s speech at the UN General Assembly regarding the second peace summit proposal (KommersantSeptember 25; RIACSeptember 26). Moscow has strongly ruled out attending the summit, but it may have trouble derailing it as India cautiously expresses its interest in hosting the summit (RBCSeptember 21; NV.uaSeptember 24).
The resonance of rhetoric criticizing nuclear threats among countries in the Global South is clearly a major concern for the Kremlin as it constantly seeks opportunities to extend its influence elsewhere in the world (Russia in Global AffairsSeptember 1). Formal recognition of North Korea’s nuclear status, which requires Pyongyang’s willingness to continue supplying artillery shells to the depleting Russian stockpile, worries many stakeholders in the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.The Moscow TimesSeptember 26). The Russian leadership attaches great importance to ensuring the success of the BRICS (initially Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) summit scheduled to be held in Kazan, Tatarstan on October 22-24. These strategic calculations may force Putin to reduce the nuclear saber-rattling in the weeks before the meeting (RIACSeptember 25).
Key to the success of the BRICS summit is Chinese President Xi Jinping, who has confirmed his intention to attend but has expressed his distaste for Putin’s enthusiastic approach to nuclear issues in various subtle ways.RBCSeptember 12). Beijing is proposing an international treaty banning the first use of nuclear weapons. Amendments to Russia’s nuclear doctrine are inconsistent with this initiative (RIACSeptember 27).
Experts in Moscow assess China’s displeasure extremely carefully and tend to conclude that it will remain superficial so that no negative consequences for the developing strategic partnership can be expected (“Rossiiskaya Gazeta”September 26). Such views are justified by an assessment of China’s continued efforts to strengthen its nuclear capabilities, including the recent test of an intercontinental ballistic missile (KommersantSeptember 25). Russia’s program of such tests has been scaled back significantly, and the explosion of an RS-28 Sarmat missile in a silo at the Plesetsk Cosmodrome in Arkhangelsk Oblast is a major failure still denied by the Kremlin.MedusaSeptember 25).
Putin’s nuclear gap fits the wavering pattern. The announcement of the revisions to the nuclear doctrine was supposed to mark an upsurge in Russia’s nuclear coercion efforts. The Kremlin hopes that these amendments will increase Western fears about Russia’s nuclear potential and affect the course of the Ramstein-format meeting. A further pause in nuclear rhetoric, intended to demonstrate responsible statesmanship ahead of the BRICS summit, is also reasonably predictable.
Ukraine’s series of long-range strikes will continue, but these increasingly spectacular strikes—whether with locally produced or Western-supplied weapons—will make little difference to Russia’s nuclear maneuvering in the political space of a protracted war. Like any aging autocrat, Putin is too self-absorbed to understand that his blatant blackmail makes it impossible for Western leaders to capitulate.
