Russia’s Nov. 21 missile strike on a sprawling industrial complex on the Dnieper had more strategic resonance than material damage, rekindling difficult questions about the ever-changing nature of the protracted Russia-Ukraine war and how to manage its escalation.
Kyiv in April 2024. Photo: STR/NurPhoto via Getty Images
The technical information The missile in question still has less, but its range is definitely average (more than tactical and less intercontinental) and its multiple warheads make it more suitable for nuclear strikes than conventional strikes. President Vladimir Putin holiday “battle test” and vowed to execute more of them, demonstrating his desire to maintain control over the escalation of hostilities as well as the strategic initiative.
This ambition is contested by Ukraine and held back by NATO, so in reality, the three sides of the protracted war have different approaches and specific measures to manage the threat of escalation, primarily with regard to the use of nuclear weapons, but also geographically. conditions. During November, all three approaches were tested, and the war took on new dimensions, however significant and not dangerous. escalation.
What makes Putin’s approach difficult for particular and other actors mind game prevention is his determination to decide what constitutes an escalation and what does not. A Ukrainian drone struck the basics Russian strategic aviation and early warning radars could be interpreted as escalator actions, but the Russian high command ignored them. In contrast, Western missiles launch tactical strikes on Russian territory was determined As a major escalation, which is claimed by Putin to change the nature of the war and require a strong asymmetric response from Russia. In fact, the strike of US-supplied ATACM missiles is one ammunition depot On November 19, in the Bryansk region, less than the number of drones struck. arsenal September 18 in the Tver region.
However, Putin felt compelled to follow through on his threat and was clearly delighted that the experimental Oreshnik missile hit its intended target instead of failing to explode during launch. Sarmat rocket On September 22 at the Plesetsk Cosmodrome. He continued to brag about this holiday for several days, but his descriptions were such. confusing misinformation is hard to distinguish from ignorance. In an attempt to explain why the warheads did not explode, he compared their kinetic effect to warheads Tunguska meteoractually exploded On June 30, 1908, over Eastern Siberia. As an aside, another Oreshnik (which is actually assembly from several designs) would require weeks and mass production is not possible due to limited industrial capacity.
Ukraine’s approach is based on exposing Russia’s bluffs and refusing to bend to Putin’s will. blackmail. Many cities in Ukraine have faced Russian missile strikes in the 1,000-day war (and counting), but threats to continue non-strategic nuclear strikes are often discussed. Moscow expertsdoes not make a noticeable impression. The Ukrainian command has its own ideas about the escalation surprise attack The entry into the Kursk region, which began on August 6 and is still ongoing, represented a huge expansion of the war zone. Shocked by this bold intervention, one would have expected Putin to overreact and take desperate measures, but he did. downplay the importance Occupation of Russian territory by enemy troops. When it became clear that the Russian forces did not have the necessary reserves to carry out the order to withdraw the Ukrainian brigades, Putin initiated the deployment of troops to this battlefield. about 10,000 soldiers “Imported” from North Korea. These were reinforcements legitimate targets For Ukraine’s strikes, but more importantly, North Korea’s direct involvement represented a sharp geographic escalation of the European war into the East Asian strategic theater. Valery ZalujnyThe former commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian army had good reasons to describe this development as the beginning of the third world war.
Admittedly an exaggeration, this assessment is useful in illuminating the limitations posed by deep concerns about NATO’s confrontation with Russia and escalation in its support strategy for Ukraine. Any collective decision to provide the Ukrainian army with offensive weapon systems – for example, the creation of coalitions around Ukraine. Leopard main battle tanks and F-16 fighters – developed several weeks after measuring a potentially destabilizing effect. These debates have become a key tool for the Alliance to manage escalation, not least by eliminating the element of surprise and giving Russia enough time to prepare. countermeasures Against the new opportunities of Ukraine.
A key influence in setting this pattern has undoubtedly been decision-making in the Biden administration, and in retrospect, it’s easy to criticize for uncertainties and procrastinations. Assessment of US intelligence real risk President Biden was clearly impressed by Russia’s non-strategic nuclear strike in October 2022, when the Russian group fought at a crossing on the west side of the Dnieper River in the Kherson region. This crisis was resolved in several bilateral ways meetingsbut Biden has since opted to err on the side of caution intelligence chiefs He openly argued about the importance of not being intimidated by Russian nuclear saber strikes.
The paradoxical result of the interaction of the three approaches to escalation management is that attempts by Russia, Ukraine, and NATO to deter the enemy from high-risk actions have failed, but no serious escalation has occurred in the protracted war. The nuclear threshold has not been exceeded, but the corrections in Russian nuclear doctrine amounts to a deliberate attempt to reduce multiple”red lines” was drawn and passed, and the discourses of escalation converged to a bewildering conclusion that resembled the popular “celebrity”.Schrödinger’s cat” paradox, when the imaginary cat in the black box is alive and dead at the same time. The war progresses and attrition accumulates, putting ever more pressure on all sides who find the prospect of a stalemate military freeze unsatisfying and risky. This convergence of views could create an agreement to end the war with another paradoxical escalation that happens and does not happen, because the alternative condemns the leaders to continue playing with very high stakes.
- Pavel K. Baev He is a research professor at PRIO
- This text was first published by Panorama December 3, 2024
