Russian President Vladimir Putin has given assurances over the past 27 months that he is ready to negotiate an end to the war against Ukraine, which Kiev dismissed as an attempt to pressure him into surrender (see EDM, January 29February 6, 26, April 15).
Meeting at the Russian Cabinet of Ministers in the Kremlin in May 2024. Photo: Kremlin Press Office/Anadolu via Getty Images
Last week’s maneuver may be a change in Russia’s war strategy. Instead of another statement, the Kremlin first organized a series of “leaks” collected by the Reuters news agency.
Unequivocal denial of leaks
The agency immediately denied the leaks, but in such a vague manner that the item may appear to have been confirmed (Reuters; RBC; RIA NovostiMay 24). The main message is that Putin is ostensibly willing to freeze military operations on the current front line and is confident that he can “sell” these compromises as victories, even as he abandons his maximalist goals of rolling back NATO expansion. “De-Nazification” of Ukraine (KommersantMay 24).
The leaks are likely an attempt to derail final preparations for the June 15 and 16 Ukrainian peace summit scheduled for June 15 and 16 in Bürgenstock, Switzerland, which has been relentlessly criticized by the Russian propaganda machine (Rossiiskaya gazetaMay 24). Putin complained that Russia was not invited while claiming that Russia was not interested in discussing Ukraine’s vision of a peace settlement, which was far removed from the “reality on the ground” (KommersantMay 24). Moscow has taken note of the changes in the agenda of the summit and is now focusing more on global issues such as food security and nuclear risks (IzvestiaMay 22). In addition, Russian diplomacy has spent significant efforts to undermine the credibility of the event. Moscow is now worried that Ukraine’s willingness to downplay the important issue of restoring its territorial integrity could persuade China, India and many countries in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East to send delegations to Switzerland.RIACMay 22).
Xi Jinping’s “peace plan”
China’s position on this conflict is undoubtedly of decisive importance for Russia. During his state visit to Beijing two weeks ago, Putin expressed his full support for the “peace plan” of Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping, even if Russia’s tacit rejection of annexations is a major obstacle (see EDMMay 13; Independent newspaperMay 22). Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi accepted this idea during his visit to Brazil, suggesting that a result-oriented peace conference should include Russia and take into account its security interests (see EDMApril 17; The Moscow TimesMay 24). Despite Putin’s best efforts to foster the partnership, China’s support for Russia’s war effort remains conditional, and Moscow’s much-needed imports of technology and machinery are limited by Western sanctions.Re: RussiaMay 17; Svoboda.orgMay 21). Beijing is interested in minimizing the damage caused by the “long war” to Russia’s economic relations with Europe, and the proposal to reduce the intensity of the fighting fits well with its policy of exploiting the differences in the European Union (see Chinese short; Carnegie PolicyMay 24; TopWar.ruMay 17).
Nuclear escalation
The threat of nuclear escalation remains a central theme in the discourse on the global consequences of the war in Ukraine, which Moscow and Beijing interpret somewhat differently. China has consistently argued for prudential governance, while Putin has been stubborn. The latest step is the joint training of Russian-Belarusian tactical nuclear forces (InterfaxMay 21; see EDMMay 23). Continuing this provocative exercise while sending a message of preparation for a ceasefire may seem counterproductive. Again, the display of nuclear might was done to impress risk-averse Europeans and make them more receptive to the pseudo-peace signal (IzvestiaMay 6).
Small territorial gains
The main driving force behind the diplomatic intrigues is the open fighting in the trench warfare, which Russia still initiates (Republic.ruMay 21). The latest Russian attack on Kharkiv Oblast secured only a few destroyed villages at the cost of heavy casualties. Even “military-patriotic” Russian commentators question its strategic logic (TopCor.ruMay 22). This sequence of attacks forced NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg to publicly declare: the US and Germany’s objections to the use of long-range weapon systems equipped for strikes inside Russian territory have no meaning (MedusaMay 25). However, these small territorial gains could play an important political role in bolstering confidence in Putin’s overtures – a proposal to retreat to the border could strengthen the case for a temporary ceasefire and “convincing” Ukraine to make it permanent.
Bleeding frame
An unprecedented personnel purge in the Ministry of Defense after replacing the long-serving Sergei Shoigu with the inexperienced Andrei Belousov is a confirmation of the Kremlin’s vague scheme (see EDM, May. 16, 20, 22, 23; Svoboda.orgMay 24). Shoigu appears to have been “punished” by his appointment as Secretary of the Security Council, but continues to meet Putin at high-level events such as a visit to China (Carnegie PolicyMay 20). However, several of Shoigun’s deputies were arrested on corruption charges (easily proven) and many more resigned (see EDMMay 20). With no coherent team, Belousov now faces bureaucratic chaos in a huge and hostile ministry (Novaya newspaper EuropeMay 21). It takes time and constant disruption to establish new control over mass financial flows force majeure production with combat operations would be useful (MedusaMay 23). The leaders of the military-industrial complex, with whom Putin met last Saturday, will also prefer to move from the emergency rush codified in the new State Armament Program, which the government has begun to prepare, to a more stable demand (KnowledgeMay 24; RBCMay 25).
Putin may still refuse to pause his ground offensive and bombing campaign, concluding that constant domestic mobilization for a long war better ensures the stability of his rule. However, creating a ceasefire option could give him more flexibility in striking a new balance of parochial interests in the Kremlin’s court and maneuvering in the international arena. He may assume that direct threats strengthen European unity and transatlantic solidarity, but if the conflict is temporarily mitigated, it may soon be destroyed.
Another consideration is the possible impact of the ceasefire on the domestic situation in Ukraine, where President Volodymyr Zelensky’s leadership is collapsing. Whatever intrigues Putin tries to spin, his goal of destroying Ukraine as an independent European state remains steadfast and will be defeated by Ukrainian resilience and Western determination.
