Last week, on September 3-6, the ninth annual Eastern Economic Forum of Russia was held in Vladivostok. It was intended to promote Moscow’s commitment to focus its economic policy on the Asia-Pacific, but instead exposed the shortcomings of that ambition.
Putin at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, September 2024. Photo: kremlin.ru
In addition to demanding the transfer of all combat-capable Russian units to the battlefields in Donbas for the war in Ukraine, the Kremlin is forced to continue political efforts to contain Russia’s confrontation with the West.
Relying on China
Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke at the forum with his usual magnificence, saying that the economic growth in the Russian Far East is great and that military operations in Ukraine are going according to plan (IzvestiaSeptember 5). The latest forecasts from the Central Bank of Russia present a more sober picture. Growth is almost non-existent, mainly due to the stresses accumulated in the Russian economy during the long war (Forbes.ruSeptember 2; The Moscow TimesSeptember 5). The ripple effect of Russia’s war in Ukraine on its economy is affecting Moscow’s relations with its partners, particularly China, which Russia is increasingly relying on as it battles Western sanctions and international isolation (see EDM, January 22May 6 (1), (2), September 5).
China-Africa Cooperation
China should be Russia’s main focus. But the timing of the Vladivostok forum did not demonstrate this priority, as it coincided with the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, to which Chinese President Xi Jinping has devoted much of his personal efforts (KnowledgeSeptember 5). Chinese Vice President Han Zheng graced the Russian event with his presence. Han was previously a member of the politburo standing committee, one of the most powerful positions in the Chinese Communist Party. After leaving this position in 2022, the role he assumed as vice president is purely ceremonial. The only memorable moment of his meeting with Putin was a malfunction of the translation equipment (KommersantSeptember 4). This indicates a tendency for Russia-China economic interaction to stagnate rather than expand, and the reluctance of Chinese banks to risk punishment from US sanctions is causing turmoil in the Russian financial system (The Moscow TimesSeptember 4). Chinese companies are strongly reluctant to invest in Russia, even in projects with attractive profit margins, such as coal mines (RBCAugust 5).
Putin’s long-desired pipeline project from the Yamal gas fields to China – currently cut off from Europe’s traditional market – is hidden in a pile of memorandums of understanding (The Moscow TimesAugust 5). The project was presented during Putin’s visit to Mongolia on September 3, before his arrival in Vladivostok, but the lavish ceremony in Ulaanbaatar was mostly camouflage for the meager results of superficially cordial talks (KommersantSeptember 3). The main purpose of Putin’s visit was to set a precedent for ignoring the International Criminal Court (ICC) warrant seeking to put the commander-in-chief of Russian aggression behind bars, and full cooperation was expected from Mongolia, a member of the ICC.Novaya newspaper EuropeSeptember 3; NV.uaSeptember 2). The flowery compliments of Prime Minister of Malaysia Anwar Ibrahim, who was the guest of honor at the plenary meeting of the Vladivostok forum, were another music to Putin’s ears (KommersantSeptember 5). There were no other entries in the list of distinguished speakers.
Kursk offensive
The Kursk intervention – the latest reversal in the trajectory of the war in Ukraine – has added to the uncertainty that has clouded the course of Putin’s previous two forums. Putin has done his best to instill confidence, but reassurance can only work if foreign troops have occupied part of Russian territory for a month and show no intention of retreating (see EDM, August 15, September 3). In a departure from his previous indifferent rhetoric, Putin declared the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the Kursk region a “sacred duty” of the Russian military — something he appears to be in no rush to accomplish (Republic.ruSeptember 5). Russian reinforcements continue to enter the area, but Ukrainian brigades prefer to search for weak points of Russian forces rather than advance, so the battle situation remains stable (InsiderAugust 29). The political benefits for Kiev from this bold offensive outweigh the strategic gains, and the advantage of keeping its options open may not last long. At the same time, the possibility of the eventual withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from Kursk poses serious risks (Svoboda.orgSeptember 6).
Putin preferred to ignore the damage caused by the Ukrainian attack on Russian territory and continue the offensive in the Donbass, primarily in the direction of Pokrovsk (MedusaSeptember 7). Most of the participants in the Vladivostok forum, as well as the fact that the demonstration was not allowed, have no idea whether the square mile gained by Russian troops in Donbas is worth the ten square miles lost in Kursk Oblast. However, they are probably aware that Russia’s power projection capabilities in the vast Asia-Pacific region have declined dramatically since the start of the war. Wanting to dispel this impression, Putin considered it appropriate to visit the base of the 155th Marine Infantry Brigade in Vladivostok and praised its performance in battle (IzvestiaAugust 4). However, the brigade became famous for causing heavy losses due to the arrogant incompetence of its command (Current time18 December 2023).
Security stakeholders in the Asia-Pacific noted that Ukraine’s attack on the Kursk region did not lead to an increase in Russia’s nuclear capabilities or a revision of Russia’s nuclear doctrine.Forbes.ruSeptember 1). Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov sternly advised the media not to joke about Russia’s “red lines,” but even “patriotic” commentators were horrified by the exposed enervation of the nuclear deterrent.RBCSeptember 4; TopWar.ruSeptember 5). The main reason behind Putin’s uncharacteristic nuclear bravado and thoughtful silence among nuclear hawks in Moscow is China’s apparent distaste for escalator rhetoric (Valday clubSeptember 4). Beijing is proposing a draft treaty on the non-first use of nuclear weapons, and Moscow is obliged to express its readiness to make a positive contribution to this initiative (InterfaxAugust 27).
Organized optimism
The organized optimism of the Vladivostok forum cannot hide the fact that only the end of the war in Ukraine can allow Russia to begin to restore its eroded position and influence in the Asia-Pacific region.
At the forum, Putin felt obliged to reaffirm his openness to peace talks, which for him meant discussing the terms of Ukraine’s surrender, and only after Kiev’s troops withdrew from the Kursk region. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy made a risky choice when launching the offensive. However, he succeeded in exposing the fallacy of Putin’s position of holding a strong position and controlling the strategic initiative. Zelensky must now turn this success into progress on two important fronts: securing continued Western support and convincing skeptics in the Asia-Pacific region, including China, that his peace plan is a practical proposition, not just an information warfare maneuver. It’s a tall order to deliver a continuation of the August surprise, but Ukraine has remarkable reserves of resilience.
